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An increasing number of decisions are guided by machine learning algorithms. In
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behavior to achieve desired outcomes. This paper develops a new class of estimator
that is stable under manipulation, even when the decision rule is fully transparent. We
explicitly model the costs of manipulating different behaviors, and identify decision
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of important decisions are being made by machine learning algorithms.
Algorithms determine what information we see online (Perlich et al., 2014); who is hired, fired,
and promoted (Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017); who gets a loan (Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen,
2018), and whether to give bail and parole (Kleinberg et al., 2018). In the typical machine
learning deployment, an individual’s observed behavior is used as input to an estimator that
determines future decisions.
These applications of machine intelligence raise two related problems. First, when
algorithms are used to make consequential decisions, they create incentives for people to
reverse engineer or ‘game.’ If agents understand how their behavior affects decisions, they
may alter their behavior to achieve the outcome they desire. Second, society increasingly
demands a ‘right to explanation’ about how algorithmic decisions are made (Goodman and
Flaxman, 2016; Barocas et al., 2018). For instance, articles 13-15 of the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation mandate that “meaningful information about the logic”
of automated systems be made available to data subjects (European Union, 2016). However,
such transparency increases the scope for gaming: the more clearly that agents know how
their behavior affects a decision, the easier it is to manipulate.
These problems result from a simple core. The standard estimators that are used to
construct decision rules assume that the relationship between the outcome of interest and
human behaviors is stable. But this assumption tends to be violated as soon as a decision
rule is implemented: agents have incentives to change their behavior to achieve more favored
outcomes. When decision rules are gamed, they can produce decisions that are arbitrarily
poor or unsafe. Lenders’ portfolios may be swamped with fraud, social media may be overrun
by nefarious actors, self driving cars can be tricked into crashing (Eykholt et al., 2018). This
problem can undermine the use of machine learning in critical applications.
There are two common approaches to deal with this problem. The first, familiar to
economists, restricts models to predictors that are presumed to have a theoretical or structural
relationship to the outcome of interest.1 This theory-driven approach amounts to having
a dogmatic prior that the cost of manipulation is either infinite (for included features) or
zero (for excluded features). However, most behaviors are manipulable at some cost. The
second approach, which we refer to as the ‘industry approach’, keeps decision rules secret, and
1An extreme version of this restricts to predictors that causally affect the outcome of interest (Kleinberg
and Raghavan, 2018; Milli et al., 2019). This may make manipulation desirable: for example, an exam may
induce students to study and learn general knowledge.
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periodically updates the model to account for changes in the relationship between features
and outcomes (Bruckner and Scheffer, 2011). However, such ‘security through obscurity’
exposes current applications to substantial risk (NIST 2008). It also limits the application
of machine learning in settings where secrecy cannot be maintained (e.g., when regulations
mandate transparency, or when consumers learn decision rules directly or through third
parties) or feedback is noisy or delayed (e.g., it may take years for a social media platform to
learn that its content prioritization algorithm was gamed by foreign actors). There is also no
guarantee that the back and forth between estimation and agents will reach equilibrium.
This paper develops a new approach. We explicitly model the costs that agents incur to
manipulate their behavior, and embed the resulting game theoretic model within a machine
learning estimator. This allows us to derive estimators that anticipate strategic agents,
and which produce stable decisions even when the decision rule is fully transparent. We
demonstrate, using Monte Carlo simulations, that our ‘strategy-robust’ estimator performs
better than standard models when these costs are known, even if costs are misspecified. We
then test the theory in a real world environment, through an incentivized field experiment
with 1,557 people in Kenya. We use the experiment to elicit costs of manipulating behavior,
and to show that the strategy-robust approach leads to more robust machine decisions.
The paper is organized into two main parts. The first part develops a method to estimate
strategy-robust decision rules that are stable under manipulation. We consider a supervised
machine learning framework for a policymaker making a decision yi for each individual i.
Each individual prefers a larger decision yi. We observe a training subset of cases that
possess both features xi and optimal decisions yi. The policymaker seeks to estimate a
decision rule yˆ(xi) for cases in a testing subset where only features xi are observed. Standard
methods assume that xi’s are fixed: training and test samples of (xi, yi) are drawn from same
distribution. Our method allows individuals to adjust behavior in response to the incentives
generated by the decision rule: xi(yˆ(·)) is a function of the decision rule. As a result, while
our training samples come from an unincentivized distribution (xi(0), yi); test samples come
from (xi(yˆ(·)), yi). We assume individuals pay quadratic costs for manipulating behavior
(xi), and that these costs can be parametrized by a matrix Ci. We describe several methods
to estimate this cost matrix, a new object needed to determine how behavior shifts when
incentivized.
To sharpen intuition, we derive results for linear decision rules of the form yˆ(x) = βx.
The resulting estimator takes a simple nonlinear least squares form. Our method introduces
a new notion of fit, which has analogues to other common linear regression approaches.
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Ordinary least squares (OLS) maximizes fit within sample; two stage least squares (2SLS)
sacrifices fit within sample to estimate coefficients that have causal interpretations; penalized
least squares (such as LASSO and ridge) sacrifice within-sample fit to better generalize to
other samples drawn from the same population. Our method sacrifices fit within sample to
maximize equilibrium fit in the counterfactual where the decision rule is used to allocate
resources, and agents manipulate against it. Our estimator is an example of a new class of
estimator that maximizes counterfactual fit–predictive fit in a counterfactual state of the
world.
We use Monte Carlo simulations to compare this new strategy-robust approach to common
alternatives. OLS can perform extremely poorly when agents behave strategically. The
industry approach, which periodically retrains the model, can also perform poorly and
converge slowly, or not at all. By contrast, our method adjusts the model to anticipate
manipulation. In simulations where agents respond to the decision rule, and manipulation
costs are known, our approach exceeds the performance of other estimators. Our approach can
exceed the performance of others even if manipulation costs are misspecified for some cases.
Under certain parameters, the presence of manipulation can improve predictive performance,
if it signals unobservables associated with the outcome of interest (in the spirit of Spence,
1973). In these cases, one may wish to use certain features that are manipulable by the types
that you want to screen in, but not by those you want to screen out.
In the second part of the paper, we implement and test our method in the context
of a field experiment in Kenya. This experiment allows us to compare the performance
of the strategy-robust estimator to standard machine learning algorithms in a real-world
environment. Specifically, we built a new smartphone app that passively collects data on how
people use their phones, and disburses monetary rewards to users based on the data collected.
The app is designed to mimic ‘digital credit’ products that are spreading dramatically
through the developing world (Francis et al., 2017). Digital credit products similarly collect
user data, and convert it into a credit score using machine learning, based on the insight
that historical patterns of mobile phone use can predict loan repayment (Bjo¨rkegren, 2010;
Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen, 2019). However, as these systems have scaled, manipulation has
become commonplace as borrowers learn what behaviors will increase their credit limits
(McCaffrey et al., 2013; Bloomberg, 2015).2
This field experiment produces several results. First, consistent with prior work, we show
that a person’s mobile phone usage behaviors (xi(0)) can be used to predict characteristics of
2A recent survey in Kenya and Tanzania found that one of the top five reasons people report saving money
in digital accounts is to increase the loan amount qualified for (FSD Kenya, 2018).
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the phone user, such as income, intelligence (Raven’s matrices), and overall activity.3 Second,
through the use of randomly-assigned experiments, we structurally estimate Ci in our model,
i.e., the relative costs of manipulating a variety of observed behaviors xi. Our experiments
offer financial incentives to participants for altering behaviors that are observed through the
app, such as increasing the number of outgoing calls in a given week, or decreasing the number
of incoming text messages. The pattern of costs is intuitive: outgoing communications are
less costly to manipulate than incoming communications; text messages, which are relatively
cheap to send, are more manipulated than calls, which are relatively expensive. We also find
that complex behaviors (such as the standard deviation of talk time) are less manipulable
than simpler behaviors (such as the average duration of talk time).
The next set of results demonstrate that strategy-robust decision rules, which account
for the costs of manipulation, perform substantially better than standard machine learning
algorithms. We make this comparison by offering rewards to people who use their phones
like a person of a particular type. For instance, some people receive a message that says,
“Earn up to 1000 Ksh if the Sensing app guesses that you are a high income earner, based on
how you use your phone,” while others receive messages that offer rewards for acting like
an “intelligent” person, and so forth. Across a variety of such decision rules, we show that
classifications made with the strategy-robust algorithm are more accurate than classifications
from standard algorithms.
Finally, we use our method to estimate the equilibrium cost of algorithmic transparency,
i.e., the cost to the policymaker incurred for disclosing details of the decision rule. In the
experiment, we experimentally vary the amount of information subjects have about the
decision rule (e.g., the model used to predict the outcome), and show that the relative
performance of the strategy-robust estimator increases with transparency. While predictive
performance decreases by on average 23% under transparency for standard machine learning
estimators, the strategy-robust estimator reduces this cost of transparency to approximately
8%. Overall, this suggests that the equilibrium cost of moving from a regime where the
decision rules are secret, to one where they are disclosed, to be less than 8% in our setting.
Our model allows policymakers to bound this equilibrium cost of transparency even without
disclosing decision rules to the world.
Taken together, the paper develops and tests a new approach to supervised learning when
agents are strategic. This relates to papers from a variety of sub-literatures have confronted the
3Prior work has used mobile phone data to predict income and wealth (Blumenstock et al., 2015;
Blumenstock, 2018), gender (Blumenstock et al., 2010; Frias-Martinez et al., 2010), and employment status
(Sundsøy et al., 2016), and loan repayment (Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen, 2018, 2019), .
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notion that agents will act strategically when their actions are used to determine allocations.
Our paper aims to integrate these approaches by applying principles of mechanism design
to the machine learning setting, where data may have many dimensions and traditional
approaches to designing incentive-compatible allocations are not possible. To our knowledge,
this is also the first paper to estimate and test a strategy-robust machine learning estimator
using data from a field experiment.
1.1 Connection to Literature
The dilemma of manipulation is not new. Goodhart (1975), in what has since become
referred to as ‘Goodhart’s Law’, noted that once a measure becomes a target, it ceases to
be a good measure. Lucas (1976) also famously observed that historical patterns can warp
when economic policy changes. More broadly, our approach connects with literatures in both
economics and computer science.
Our problem can be viewed as a mechanism design problem. Canonical signaling models
(Spence, 1973) rely on a single crossing condition to allow full revelation of individual types.
In our setting, like the settings of Frankel and Kartik (2019) and Ball (2019), there are two
forms of heterogeneity: types θi and the costs of manipulating behavior Ci. Frankel and
Kartik (2019) show that unobserved heterogeneity in manipulation costs Ci ‘muddles’ the
relationship between behavior xi and types θi, causing the single crossing condition to fail.
That paper shows that muddling reduces the information available in a market. Ball (2019)
extends that framework to multiple dimensions of behavior, and in a theoretical model similar
to ours, characterizes and proves the existence of equilibrium. That paper also considers how
the problem is affected by the degree of commitment available to the policymaker. Relative
to this work, our paper builds a model that can be empirically estimated, which allows us to
probabilistically separate types and costs.4
Our paper is also related to the problem in public finance of setting taxes in environments
where agents adapt their behaviors. Our method weights predictors by the inverse of the
4In a related setting, Hussam et al. (2017) implement an incentive compatible mechanism that collects
peer reports to estimate an individual’s entrepreneurial ability. That method requires gathering peer reports
from a community during implementation; in contrast, our approach produces stand in replacements for
standard machine learning models, which can use arbitrary data on behavior. Also related, Holmstro¨m
(1979) shows that a principal should use any information that has signal when contracting with an agent.
Our method suggests how manipulable information be downweighted. Eliaz and Spiegler (2018) study a
related problem where a “statistician” is making decisions on behalf of an agent, with two-sided incomplete
information: the agent knows his preferred behavior, but the statistician knows the decision rule. They focus
on characterizing incentive-compatible estimators, and find that commonly-used regularized linear models
create incentive issues.
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matrix of the costs of manipulating them, in a manner similar to Ramsey (1927). Relatedly,
Mirrlees (1971) recommends using proxies when it is not possible to observe the true income
earning ability of potential beneficiaries. Niehaus et al. (2013) find that when implementing
agents can be corrupted, considering additional poverty indicators can worsen the targeting
of benefits, by making it more difficult to verify eligibility.
Finally, our approach relates to existing strands in the computer science literature. The
theoretical computer science community has recently considered this problem as one of
‘strategic classification’ (Hardt et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2018). This literature is focused
primarily on obtaining computationally efficient learning algorithms, and how strategic
behavior can affect statistical definitions of fairness (Hu et al., 2019; Milli et al., 2019). In
computer security, ‘adversarial machine learning’ considers how strategic adversaries can
systematically undermine supervised learning algorithms, typically by injecting erroneous
data into the model fitting procedure.5 Also related is the concept of ‘covariate shift’, which
considers scenarios where a test distribution differs from the training distribution. However,
it is common to assume that the conditional distribution y|x is fixed, and the distribution
of x’s changes exogenously (Sayed-Mouchaweh and Lughofer, 2012). The manipulation we
consider induces the conditional distribution y|x to change endogenously when action is taken
based on the estimated relationship.
Thus, papers from a variety of sub-literatures have confronted the notion that agents
will act strategically when their actions are used to determine allocations. Relative to prior
work, our paper makes two main contributions. First, we develop an equilibrium model of
manipulation that can be estimated using data, which produces a machine learning estimator
that functions well under manipulation even when the decision rule is fully transparent. And
second, to our knowledge for the first time in any literature, we design and implement a
field experiment that stress-tests such an estimator in a real-world setting with incentivized
agents.
1.2 Applications and Examples
Agents game decision rules in a wide variety of empirical settings. Manipulation has been
documented in contexts ranging from New York high school exit exams (Dee et al., 2019)
and health provider report cards (Dranove et al., 2003), to pollution monitoring in China
5For instance, Bruckner and Scheffer (2011) study adversarial prediction when the agent acts in response
to an observed predictive model, with an application to spam filtering. Dong et al. (2018) model an iterated
industry approach where a policymaker observes how agents manipulate in response to previous rules, but
does not know their utility functions or costs.
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(Greenstone et al., 2019), to fish vendors in Chile (Gonzalez-Lira and Mobarak, 2019). In
the online advertising industry, firms spend many millions of dollars each year on search
engine optimization, manipulating their websites in order to receive a higher ranking from
search engine algorithms (Borrell Associates, 2016). A quick Google search suggests over 50
thousand different websites (and 3,000 YouTube videos) contain the phrase “hack your credit
score.”
We apply our method to an experiment that mimics poverty targeting. In developing
countries, where income is difficult to observe, policymakers commonly target program
eligibility (yi) based on easily observable characteristics or behaviors (xi) (Hanna and Olken,
2018). The policymaker may infer a household’s type based on the levels of these variables, or,
implicitly, on how they change in response to incentives.6 There is evidence that such decision
rules induce households to manipulate their observable features. For instance, Banerjee et al.
(2018) find that adding a question about flat screen TV ownership to a census caused people
to underreport ownership by 16% on a follow-up survey, in order to appear less wealthy.7
The method we develop is directly relevant to a variety of other settings where a policy-
maker derives a decision from a prediction (yi) based on agent behaviors (xi). These include
other supervised settings where it is possible to obtain a ground truth value of yi for a training
sample of individuals. For instance, in credit scoring applications, a decision about whether
it is prudent to provide a loan (yi) is made based on characteristics on the potential borrower
(traditional credit scores are based on the borrower’s formal credit history, but increasingly
the characteristics xi include private data like mobile phone usage (Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen,
2019) and social network structure (Wei et al., 2015)). It also includes settings where no
definite ground truth of yi exists. Search engines, social media, and spam filters attempt
to determine the quality of a piece of content (yi) based on features that can be observed
(xi: keywords, reputation of the sender, inbound links). Manipulating these features may be
costly directly, or may undermine the author’s intent in distributing the content. Similarly,
‘report cards’ for universities, hospitals, and doctors attempt to determine quality (yi) based
on indicators (xi: alumni giving rates, endowment size, acceptance rates, graduation rates).
8
6Our method thus nests this latter case of self-targeting (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Alatas et al.,
2016), which identifies beneficiaries based on willingness to engage with a costly “ordeal.”
7In other examples from the development literature, Camacho and Conover (2011) find that after a
program eligibility decision rule was made transparent to local officials in Colombia, it was manipulated by
an amount corresponding to 7% of the National Health and Social Security budget. They note, “there is
anecdotal evidence of people moving or hiding their assets, or of borrowing and lending children.”
8Our model does not consider behaviors xi that have a causal relationship to yi, where manipulation can
be productive (Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2019). It thus would not cover report card variables that directly
influence quality, nor the case of a student who ‘games’ a test by studying (xi ↑), and as a result improves
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our
theory. Section 3 describes estimation. Section 4 describes the results of our field experiment.
Section 5 discusses extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
This section introduces the model underlying our estimator, and demonstrates the intuition
with simulations.
2.1 Model
A policymaker observes a training subset of cases that possess both features xi and optimal
decisions yi. The policymaker also obtains information on the costs of manipulating features,
which will be detailed later. The policymaker would like to estimate the parameters of a
decision rule yˆ(xi) for cases in a testing subset where only features xi are observed, and may
be manipulated.
A policymaker has a preferred action yi for each individual i, denominated in units of
individuals’ utility. The action yi can be projected onto i
′s bliss behavior xi by the equation
yi = b0 + b
′xi + ei, with ei ⊥ xi representing idiosyncratic preference.
However, the policymaker observes an individual’s actual behavior xi, which may differ
from their bliss level xi. It selects a deterministic decision rule of the form
9:
yˆ(xi) = β0 + β
′xi
Individuals can manipulate their behavior xi away from their bliss level xi at some cost. i
earns utility from the decision minus these costs:
ui = yˆ(xi)− c(xi, xi)
For simplicity, we consider the case where the utility from the decision exactly coincides
with the policymaker’s prediction.10
their knowledge (yi ↑). The approach could be extended to cover such cases.
9Although randomizing a decision rule may make it harder to manipulate, it undermines a major goal of
transparency: that people know how they are evaluated.
10That is, we consider the case where the utility of the decision u(yˆ) = yˆ, which holds in our experiment.
Under more general functions u(·), our model would represent a linear approximation. One could easily
generalize our framework to allow for more general functional forms.
9
Individuals i are heterogeneous in two respects, bliss behaviors xi and gaming ability γi
(as in Frankel and Kartik (2019)).
Manipulation costs are quadratic:
c(xi, xi) =
1
2
(xi − xi)′Ci(xi − xi)
for matrix Ci:
Ci =
1
γi

α11 · · · αK1
...
. . .
...
α1K · · · αKK

Different behaviors may be differentially hard to manipulate, by themselves (the diagonal
αkk) or in conjunction with other behaviors (the off diagonals αkj). And different people may
find it easier or harder to manipulate (γi): for example, people with more technical savvy or
lower opportunity cost of time may find it easier to game decision rules.
When i knows the decision rule yˆ(xi) and receives benefits according to it, he will optimally
manipulate behavior to level:
x∗i (β) = xi+C
−1
i β
When behavior is not incentivized (β = 0), optimal behavior equals the bliss level
(x∗i (0) = xi). However, as β moves away from zero, behavior moves in the same direction,
downweighted by the cost of manipulation (as highlighted in blue).
Decision rules. The policymaker faces expected squared loss:
L (yˆ(·)) = Ei
[
[yi − yˆ (xi (yˆ(·)))]2 +M(·)
]
The first term represents fit of the model in the counterfactual where the model is
implemented and agents manipulate behavior. If the policymaker additionally cares about
the costs that individuals incur manipulating, this manipulation cost results in additional
term M(·).
Our strategy-robust decision rule is given by:
βstable = arg min
β
(
1
N
∑
i
[
yi − β0 − β′(xi+C−1i β)
]2
+ . . .
)
(1)
which deviates from ordinary least squares due to the term C−1i β which captures manipu-
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lation in response to β. Additional terms ‘. . .’ can include any weight M(·) the policymaker
places on manipulation costs incurred by agents, and any regularization terms Rλdecision(·).
Discussion
If the policymaker only cares about targeting performance (M(·) ≡ 0) and there are no
additional regularization terms (R(·) ≡ 0), then ours is a nonlinear least squares estimator.
Moment conditions are given by:
E
[
xi ·
(
yi − β0 − β′(xi + C−1i β)
)]
= −2E [C−1i β · (yi − β0 − β′(xi + C−1i β))]
This suggests that the estimator imposes that equilibrium errors in the counterfactual are
less than orthogonal to individual types xi: they equal the negative of an adjustment factor
2C−1i β that accounts for the fact that β induces a marginal incentive to respond. When
Ci ≡∞, the resulting estimator corresponds to OLS.
When the policymaker cares about not only the resulting allocation, but also the manipu-
lation costs that individuals incur, this is accompanied by the term M(·), which can take a
different form depending on policymaker preferences. An entity that is narrowly concerned
with its own objective (e.g., profits in the case of a firm) may thus select different decision
rules from those that maximize social welfare (for example, a firm may be satisfied with an
equilibrium where all individuals expend welfare gaming a test, where a social planner may
not).11
To reduce overfitting in small samples, one may also include common forms of regu-
larization; for example, RLASSO
λdecision
(β) = λdecision
∑
k>0 |βk| or Rridgeλdecision(β) = λdecision
∑
k>0 β
2
k.
Hyperparameter λdecision can be set with cross validation in the baseline sample. Under these
regularization terms, when M(·) ≡ 0 and Ci ≡∞ the resulting estimator corresponds to
LASSO, or ridge, respectively.
2.2 Intuition
We demonstrate the method with Monte Carlo simulations.
We derive desired payments y, from individual types x and payment rule b, with deviations
e. We then assess decision rules yˆ(x) based on observed behaviors x generated with different
estimators. Our strategy-robust estimators anticipate that behaviors x may change when
11For example, the policymaker may place weight w on the sum of manipulation costs: M(·) = w∑i c(xi +
C−1i β, xi). The Supplemental Appendix derives a microfounded term for the case of proxy means testing.
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they are used in a decision rule, factoring in manipulation costs C. This section assumes
that manipulation costs are known.
Comparative Statics
We consider a case where x1 is more predictive than x2 in baseline behavior, but would be
easily manipulated if used in a decision rule (b1 > b2 but α11  α22).
Figure 1 compares our method to OLS and LASSO, which mistakenly place most weight
on x1. OLS maximizes predicted performance within the unincentivized sample (xi(0), yi); as
shown in Figure 1a, it performs poorly as manipulation becomes easier. Figure 1b shows that
for a given cost of manipulation, LASSO shrinks these coefficients. However, when LASSO
selects variables, it does exactly the wrong thing: it kicks x2 out of the regression first. In
contrast, our method considers how predictive features will be in equilibrium when the decision
rule is implemented: (xi(β), yi). As shown in Figure 1c, when manipulation costs are high,
our method approaches OLS, but as manipulation becomes easier, our method substantially
penalizes x1. Our method can also be combined with LASSO or ridge penalization to fine
tune out of sample fit.12
If each feature is equally costly to manipulate, our method shrinks them together,
similar to ridge regression, as shown in Figure A2. If all individuals have the same gaming
ability (γi ≡ γ), then manipulation shifts behavior uniformly and does not affect predictive
performance. However, even though predictive performance is high, individuals’ can spend
substantial utility on manipulation. Figure A1 develops this intuition further, by showing
how the strategy-robust method penalizes indicators that are easy to shift: Figure A1a shows
the effect of scaling the cost of one behavior (x2). As the cost of manipulating that particular
behavior (α22) decreases, it is penalized, and weight is shifted to other behaviors. The method
also penalizes indicators that make it easier to shift other predictive indicators (in a manner
similar to Ramsey (1927) taxation). Figure A1b shows that the effect of cost interactions:
when manipulating x1 makes it easier to manipulate x2 (α12 sufficiently negative), our method
further reduces weight on x1 .
Performance
Table 1 shows the results of an example Monte Carlo simulation, chosen to demonstrate how
standard approaches can fail. In this simulation, type x1 has a large weight in the desired
12See Appendix Figure A2 for a comparison to ridge regression, as well as a demonstration of combining
our method with ridge penalization.
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Figure 1: Common vs. Strategy Robust Estimators
(a) βOLS(1/γ) (b) βLASSO(λ; γ = 1) (c) βstable(1/γ)
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Note: The first behavior is more predictive (b1 > b2), but is easily manipulable (α11  α22). (a)
OLS performance deteriorates substantially when behavior can be manipulated. (b) LASSO
penalization favors x1, which will be manipulated as soon as the decision rule is implemented. (c)
Our method anticipates that x1 will be manipulated if it is incentivized. It shifts weight to x2 as
behavior becomes manipulable.
xi
iid∼ N (0, 1), b = [1.4, 1], Chet = 1γγi
[
4 0
0 32
]
, 1
γheti
iid∼ Uniform [0, 10], ei iid∼ N (0, 0.25).
Squared error measured on an out of sample draw from the same population, incentivized to that
decision rule.
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payment (b1 = 3) relative to the other two dimensions (b2 = b3 = 0.1); however, the resulting
behavior x1 is much easier to manipulate (α11 = 1 vs. α22 = 2 and α33 = 4).
In this environment, OLS considers the static relationship in the unmanipulated data.
This rule would perform well if behavior were held fixed (no manipulation column); however,
once consumers adjust to the rule, it makes terrible decisions (manipulation column).
The industry approach would retrain (refresh) this model after this manipulation. If
we observe how consumers adjust their behavior and reestimate OLS, we obtain βOLS(1),
which places negative weight on the manipulated x1. However, its also makes terrible
decisions when consumers respond to it. We can try to do better by repeatedly allowing
individuals to best respond, and then reestimating the decision rule. But even with perfect
information and no changes in the environment, this process can make poor decisions en
route to convergence, or may not converge at all. If we estimate βOLS(r) using data from all
prior periods (1, . . . , r − 1), it continues to make terrible decisions over several iterations of
the algorithm designer announcing decision rules to consumers, and learning from how they
respond. While the performance of these decisions then begins to improve, it would require
sequentially announcing over a thousand different rules to consumers, and learning from how
they responded to each one, to approach equilibrium. (See the second set of estimates in
Table 1.) If we instead rely on only recent data, estimating βOLS(r) using only data from the
prior period (r − 1), this approach does not reach equilibrium: it alternates between decision
rules that place high and low weight on x1 (see Table A1). Thus standard approaches can
perform poorly even in ideal cases. If there were noise or frictions in learning, the risks
of this approach are greater: the rule may appear to be performing well, and suddenly
be devastatingly undermined (for example, Gonzalez-Lira and Mobarak (2019) find that
increased enforcement of a ban on selling an endangered fish can lead vendors to learn about
the decision rule, and more effectively undermine it).
In contrast, our strategy-robust estimator (βstable) anticipates that including a behavior in
the decision rule will shift that behavior. It penalizes the easily manipulable behavior x1, and
shifts weight to behaviors that are harder to manipulate (x2 and x3). It sacrifices performance
in the environment in which it is trained (in sample, no manipulation) for performance in
the counterfactual where there is manipulation. When individuals manipulate as described
in the model, our estimator exceeds the performance of other estimators.
Our method can reduce risk even if manipulation costs are misestimated. We consider a
case with two measurement mistakes: (a) all off diagonal elements are set to zero, and (b) the
estimated costs of manipulation are two times too large. Performance deteriorates relative to
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the case where we know the true cost matrix, but our method still outperforms OLS in the
presence of manipulation. One can use our method as a first step towards equilibrium, and
then follow it with the industry approach; as shown in the bottom rows, doing so skips the
terrible decisions made in the first two iterations of the industry approach.
Manipulation can improve performance
Manipulation can improve performance, if ease of manipulation (γi) is correlated with the
outcome (yi). In that case, manipulation itself represents a signal of the underlying type, as
in Spence (1973), and applications of self-targeting (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Alatas et
al., 2016). An example is shown in Table A2: manipulation improves the performance even
of na¨ıve estimators, as shown in the first two rows. Our method can additionally exploit cost
heterogeneity, and thus further improves performance as shown in the third row.
3 Estimation
Our model can be fully estimated with experimental data. To estimate manipulation costs,
we hire study participants to undermine component parts of the model, and gauge how
sensitive these manipulations are to incentives.
We observe multiple time periods. Each period, an individual may desire to deviate from
bliss behavior due to manipulation, or shocks that are common (µt) or individual specific
(it):
uit = yˆ(xi)− c(xi, xi) + (µt + it) · (xi − xi)
where both components are mean zero: Eµt = 0 and Eit = 0. Then, in week t we will
observe behavior:
x∗it(β) = xi + µt + it + C
−1
i β (2)
We parameterize the inverse of the cost matrix as follows:
C−1i = γi · C−1
with elements of inverse costs defined for convenience as:
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Table 1: Manipulation Can Harm Prediction (Monte Carlo)
Decision Rule Performance (squared loss)
β0 β1 β2 β3 No manip. Manipulation
Panel A: Data generating process
bDGP 0.200 3.000 0.100 0.100 0.267 3745.046
Panel B: Standard Approaches
βOLS 0.205 3.042 0.061 0.116 0.266 3961.225
‘Industry’ Approach (estimated cumulatively)
βOLS(1) after βOLS -0.798 0.061 2.090 -1.675 3.275 625.762
βOLS(2) after βOLS -2.174 0.174 0.436 0.143 12.861 8.369
βOLS(3) after βOLS -1.376 0.165 0.573 0.483 9.343 4.415
...
βOLS(100) after βOLS -1.619 0.316 0.753 -0.059 8.442 2.105
...
βOLS(1000) after βOLS -1.854 0.489 0.582 -0.124 9.211 1.959
Panel C: Strategy Robust Method
βstable -1.813 0.503 0.536 -0.096 9.155 1.939
If costs are misestimated:
βstable
Cˆi=2diag(Ci)
-1.566 0.658 0.719 -0.352 6.893 10.826
Followed by Industry Approach (estimated cumulatively):
βOLS(1) after βstable
Cˆi=2diag(Ci)
-2.045 0.800 0.042 0.418 10.891 4.447
βOLS(2) after βstable
Cˆi=2diag(Ci)
-2.022 0.558 0.327 0.137 10.685 2.453
Notes: Monte Carlo simulation results. Panel A shows the coefficients that relate the outcome (y) to
behaviors (x) under the data generating process (DGP). Panel B shows coefficients from OLS; Panel C shows
coefficients estimated with the strategy robust method. Performance is assessed on the same sample of
individuals, under behavior without manipulation: xi(0), or with: xi(β). Parameters:
C =

1.0 0.1 0.2
0.1 2.0 0.8
0.2 0.8 4.0
 , x iid∼ N
0,

1 1 0.1
1 2 1
0.1 1 1

, γi =
{
1 xi1 ≤ 0.2
10 xi1 > 0.2
, ei
iid∼ N(0, 0.25)
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C−1 =:

c11 · · · cK1
...
. . .
...
c1K · · · cKK

Gaming ability includes two types of heterogeneity:
γi = e
−ωzi + vi
It is allowed to vary with characteristics zi that are observable in the training sample
(but need not be observed in an implementation sample; for example, we survey participants
on tech savviness). It also includes unobserved heterogeneity vi ∼ V with Evi = 0, which
will enter the model as random effects.
We estimate strategy-robust decision rules in two steps.
3.1 Primitives
We first estimate primitives: types x, cost parameters ω and C−1, and the distribution of
unobserved gaming ability V .
Types
We infer types x by observing baseline behavior prior to the implementation of a decision
rule. When β = 0, behavior will not be manipulated. We can estimate types and time period
fixed effects with moment conditions derived from the equation:
x∗it(0) = xi + µt + it (3)
including only time periods where β = 0.
Costs
Our main specification recovers manipulation costs experimentally. Each week we randomly
assign individuals to a decision rule βit. The decision rule may be a control, in which case
βit ≡ 0. Or, it may be a treatment group that incentivizes one behavior k ∈ 1...K, by
disclosing a rule that pays incentives for k: βitk > 0 but not for other behaviors: βitj = 0 for
j 6= k. These treatments make it possible to recover the inverse cost matrix (diagonal and
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off-diagonal elements), as well as heterogeneous gaming ability (observed ω and unobserved
V ).
Moment Conditions
We recover all parameters jointly with the following moment conditions.
Incentives are orthogonal to idiosyncratic behavior shocks (E[βitkitj] = 0). For each pair
of behaviors jk (including j = k) this yields sample moment condition:
0 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
βitk
[
xijt − xij − µjt − βitj
(
e−ωzi · ckj
)]
We also have E[itj] = 0: for each time period t and behavior k, we obtain:
µkt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
xikt − xik − βit
(
e−ωz · C−1)]
For each individual i and behavior k, we obtain:
xik =
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
xikt − µkt − βit
(
e−ωz · C−1)]
given T observations.
Unobserved heterogeneity is mean zero (E[vi] = 0), yielding:
0 =
1
T
∑
i,k,t where k incentivized
[
xikt − xik − µkt
C−1βit
− e−ωzi
]
Each heterogeneity characteristic z ∈ z is orthogonal to unobserved heterogeneity
(E[zivi] = 0), yielding:
0 =
1
Tz
∑
i
zi
∑
k,t where k incentivized
[
xikt − xik − µkt
C−1βit
− e−ωzi
]
These moment conditions jointly identify x, C−1, and ω.
Joint Estimation
We jointly solve for the parameters to minimize the squared distance from zero:
L(x, C−1,ω) +Rλ
costs
costs (C
−1,ω)
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where L(·) represents the associated general method of moments (GMM) loss function.
Penalization and Cross Validation We make include two adjustments to reduce
overfitting of the cost matrix to our limited dataset. First, we impose the constraint that
incentivizing a behavior increases it: cjj > 0. Second, we regularize the cost estimates:
Rλ
costs
costs (·) =
[
λcostsdiagonal
∑
k
c2kk + λ
costs
offdiagonal
∑
j 6=k
c2jk
][∑
i
e−2ωz
]
where we allow the possibility of using separate hyperparameters λcosts = {λcostsdiagonal, λcostsoffdiagonal}
for diagonal and off diagonal costs. These penalize the cost of manipulation towards infinity
(ease of manipulation towards zero), which will tend to penalize our method’s estimates
towards standard methods (OLS/LASSO/etc).
We jointly solve for parameters x, C−1, and ω, and hyperparameters λcosts to minimize
out of sample prediction error, using cross validation. Then, we impose the optimal λcosts
and jointly estimate x, C−1, and ω on the full sample.
Unobserved Gaming Ability
After estimating these parameters, we back out the distribution of unobserved gaming ability
V in two steps. First we compute whether each individual manipulates more or less than
predicted during incentivized weeks:
v˜i =
1
Ki
∑
k
1
Ti
∑
t where k incentivized
[
xikt − xik − µkt
C−1βit
− e−ωzi
]
Second, to reduce the impact of noise and outliers, we shrink and winsorize these backed
out shocks. We form the empirical distribution V = {max(φ · v˜i, v)}i, where v is the lowest
value of v˜ that leads to a nonnegative implied gaming ability.13 We set the shrinkage factor
φ to 0.005 so that less than 5% of distribution is winsorized.14 This yields a distribution of
costs Ci.
3.2 Decision Rules
Given these primitives, a strategy robust decision rule is given by:
13That is, v = mini(v˜i|v˜i ≥ minj(e−ωzj )).
14After shrinkage, 4.1% of observations are winsorized.
19
βstable = arg min
β
E
[
1
N
∑
i
[
yi − β0 − β′(xi + C−1i β)
]2
+Rλ
decision
decision (β,y,C)
]
taken over expectation over Ci, and given decision rule regularization term R
λdecision(·).
Hyperparameter λdecision is set through cross validation in the unmanipulated sample (where
we can observe ground truth):
λdecision = c.v. arg min
λcv
[
min
βnaive
[
1
N
∑
i
[
yi − βnaive0 − βnaivexi
]2
+Rλ
cv
decision(β
naive,y,C)
]]
4 Experiment
We designed a field experiment to test the performance of our strategy-robust estimator in a
real-world setting. Design started in 2017. Working with the Busara Center for Behavioral
Economics in Nairobi, we developed and deployed a new smartphone-based application (‘app’)
to 1,557 research subjects. The app was designed to mimic the key features of the ‘digital
credit’ apps that are quickly transforming consumer credit in developing countries (Francis et
al., 2017). In Kenya, at the time of our study, CGAP (2018) estimates that 27% of all adults
had an outstanding ‘digital credit’ loan. These phone-based apps construct an alternative
credit score (yˆi) based on how each applicant uses their phone (xi; Bjo¨rkegren (2010);
Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen (2019)). The app we built similarly collects data on how each subject
uses their phone, and uses that data to make cash transfer decisions. This section describes
the app and experimental design (Section 4.1); estimates costs of manipulation and derives
strategy-robust decision rules using our method; and compares the performance of these new
estimators to traditional learning algorithms (Section 4.3). Our design was pre-specified in a
pre-analysis plan registered in the AEA RCT registry under AEARCTR-0004649.
4.1 Experimental design and smartphone app
Our experiment is intended to create an environment with incentives similar to those of a
‘digital credit’ lending app. These apps run in the background on a smartphone, and collect
rich data on phone use (including data on communications, mobility, social media behavior,
and much more). Digital credit apps use this information to allocate loans to people who
appear creditworthy (i.e., for whom yˆi exceeds some threshold). Since financial regulations
prevented us from actually underwriting loans to research subjects, we instead focused on
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analogous problems where a decisionmaker wishes to allocate resources to individuals with
specific characteristics—for instance, by paying individuals who have a certain income level,
or other characteristic (e.g., intelligence, level of activity, education).15 This allows us to
focus on the mechanics of manipulation in a prediction task, which is the same regardless of
which outcome is predicted.
Smartphone app
The ‘Smart Sensing’ app we built has has two key features. First, it runs in the background
on the smartphone to capture anonymized metadata on how individuals use their phones,
such as when calls or texts are placed, which apps are installed and used, geolocation,
battery usage, wifi connections, and when the screen was on. In total, we extract over
K¯ > 1, 000 behavioral features — Appendix Figure A3 shows the correlation between 80
different behavioral indicators (“features”) collected through the app.16 Second, the app
provides a platform to deliver weekly “challenges” to research subjects (see Figure 2). These
challenges appear on the subject’s phone, and offer financial incentives based on their behavior.
The challenges can be very simple (‘You will receive 12 Ksh. for every incoming call you
receive this week’) or more complex (‘Earn up to 1000 Ksh. if the Sensing app guesses you
are a high-income earner’). Users are paid a base amount of 100 Ksh. for uploading data,
plus any challenge winnings, directly via M-PESA at the conclusion of each week.
Study population and recruitment
The subject population consists of Kenyans aged 18 years or older who own a smartphone
and are able to travel to the Busara center in Nairobi. Participants were recruited through in
person solicitations in public spaces in neighborhoods around Nairobi. From this master list
of potential participants, every third individual was saved for a ‘top up’ sample; we drew
invited individuals from this list to participate later in the experiment, to form a fresh test
sample. The remaining sample was invited at the beginning. All individuals were sequentially
invited for an enrollment session at the Busara center. (The center had a capacity to enroll
200 people per week.) During enrollment, participants complete a survey on a tablet on
demographics and technology usage. These responses will form the ground truth about users
15While these target predictions may bear little resemblance to credit-worthiness, there are many settings
where characteristics like these are being inferred by digital traces (for example, welfare programs that target
unmarried women, or digital advertisers who target college students).
16The app is designed to capture this data with minimal impact on battery life and performance. Data is
uploaded to secure Busara servers at a set frequency, or can be uploaded manually.
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Figure 2: Smart Sensing App
(a) Installation Screen (b) Challenge with Hint (c) Earnings Calculator
that we seek to infer based on phone usage behavior.
Prospective participants were given the opportunity to install the Sensing App on their
phones for about 16 weeks. Participants were told the dimensions of behavior that would
be captured and used anonymously, and assured that no content of calls or text messages
would be recorded. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions. Participants
showed understanding of the privacy tradeoffs involved, and voiced trust in Busara based on
its positive reputation in this community. Participants who opted in to the study were offered
help installing the Sensing App, which provided the main interaction of the study. During
installation, participants had the opportunity to view the Android permissions required and to
decide whether to accept. Our sample includes only participants who opted in. Participants
could elect to receive challenges in English, Swahili, or both. 82.6% elected English, 15.9%
elected Swahili, and 1.4% elected both.
Weekly rhythm
The study follows a weekly rhythm. Each Wednesday at noon, each user receives a generic
notification, ‘Opt in to see this week’s challenge!’, via Android notifications and a text
message. When a user opens the app, it will ask them to opt in to a challenge for that
week. Only after a user opts in are the details of their challenge for that week revealed (see
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Figure 2).17 Challenges are valid until 6pm Tuesday. At the conclusion of the challenge,
users have 16 hours to ensure that their data is uploaded (until 10am Wednesday). Busara
then computes and sends any payments to users via M-PESA by noon Wednesday, and users
receive the next challenge.
Each week, participants could attrit in two ways: by not uploading their data, or by
not opting in to the challenge.18 Participants who failed to upload or opt in were sent text
message reminders, or called by Busara staff, following an attrition protocol detailed in
Appendix A1.2. We include in our analysis only participant-weeks where the participant
opted in, and uploaded during the end-of-week upload window.
4.2 Baseline predictions and model estimation
Predicting user characteristics
We begin the experiment with baseline weeks that have no incentives (no active challenges).
These baseline weeks allow us to estimate each individual’s type in absence of manipulation,
x.19 We estimate each dimension of type using Equation 3, with week fixed effects to absorb
idiosyncratic weekly shocks.
Consistent with prior work (Blumenstock et al., 2015; Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen, 2019),
we find that characteristics of users can be predicted from phone behaviors. Results for
several outcomes, based on OLS, are shown in Table 2. For characteristics such as monthly
income, intelligence (Ravens Matrices), and overall phone activity, R2 values range from 0.02
to 0.15. To make these rules easier for participants to interpret, we will focus on three
variable decision rules selected via LASSO; the last row of Table 2 shows that these obtain
similar R2 when cross validated.
Evidence that app-based challenges induce manipulation
We will eventually use variation in behavior induced by our randomized experiment to
estimate the cost of manipulating different behaviors, C(zi). This exogenous variation comes
17To minimize the possibility of differential attrition, the pre-opt-in notification was the same for all users
regardless of their assigned challenge.
18As some participants may upload data sparsely throughout the week, only those who upload within
the 21-hour window at the end of the challenge-week (between 1pm Tuesday and 10am Wednesday) will be
counted as having fully uploaded all of their weekly data.
19In these ‘control’ weeks, the subject receives a challenge of the form, ‘Dear user, you do not have to
do anything for this week’s challenge. You will receive an extra Ksh 50 for accepting this challenge.’ Our
method could also be used without these control weeks, as long as there is variation in incentives between
weeks; one would then need to net out the manipulation in estimation.
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Table 2: Behavior Predicts Individual Characteristics
Monthly Income Intelligence Activity PCA
OLS (Ravens)
Average Duration of Workday Calls -6.877 (0.471) 0.0009 (0.6) -0.0007 (0.185)
Average Duration of Outgoing Calls 5.746 (0.584) -0.0005 (0.815) 0.0003 (0.607)
Calls with Non-Contacts -27.747 (0.005)*** -0.006 (0.001)*** 0.0002 (0.649)
# Unique Evening Text Contacts 102.477 (0.129) 0.016 (0.196) 0.003 (0.435)
Incoming Call Count 14.962 (0.065) 0.001 (0.416) 0.005 (0.0)***
Evening Text Count -5.904 (0.194) -0.0007 (0.399) -0.0002 (0.322)
Average Duration of Evening Calls -1.739 (0.637) 0.0004 (0.614) 0.0007 (0.703)
Minimum Duration of Weekend Calls 2.950 (0.874) 0.003 (0.406) -0.0008 (0.935)
Outgoing Texts on Weekdays -7.130 (0.417) -0.002 (0.225) -0.0001 (0.791)
Outgoing Text Count 3.666 (0.621) 0.0008 (0.585) 0.001 (0.001)***
Outgoing Call Count 14.556 (0.004)*** -0.001 (0.14) 0.004 (0.0)***
Incoming Text Count 1.762 (0.6) 0.002 (0.013)** 0.001 (0.0)***
Intercept 5259.547 (0.0)*** 5.071 (0.0)*** -0.956 (0.0)***
N 1539 1557 1415
R2 0.0241 0.0223 0.7593
OTHER MODELS
LASSO: 3 covariate model, 10-fold CV R2 0.0180 0.0044 0.6173
Notes : Each column indicates a different prediction target. P-values in parentheses. N represents individuals.
10-fold cross-validated R2 is reported for a LASSO regression where the regularization parameter is set in
order to achieve a 3-covariate model.
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from weeks when subjects are assigned ‘simple’ challenges that incentivize modifying a single
behavior, of the form, ‘We’ll pay you M for each additional xj you do’, where amount M
and behavior j are assigned randomly. For example, one challenge was, ‘You will receive 3
Ksh. for each text you send this week, up to Ksh. 250.’ In the long run, individuals may
identify new, easier ways to manipulate these indicators. To mimic this, we held focus groups
to identify the most effective ways to manipulate different features, and during onboarding,
exposed each participant to a discussion of how one could change different types of behavior
(this is similar to hiring ‘white hat’ hackers to uncover security weaknesses).
People response to these challenges, as anticipated by our theory (Equation 2). For
intuition, Table 3 shows how behavior changed in response to simple challenges. Each column
shows a regression of an outcome on different incentives (randomly assigned). Individuals
manipulate the particular behaviors that were incentivized, as shown by the diagonal, which
is positive and significant for these outcomes. Incentivizing one behavior also affects others,
as shown in the off diagonal elements. For example, incentivizing missed incoming calls
also increases the number of texts sent (presumably requests to contacts to be called). Our
method can theoretically exploit these cross elasticities.
Since we have a limited sample on which to estimate costs, our challenges focus on
incentivizing a subset of K focal behaviors (from the full set of K¯). Specifically, we select
behaviors xC that are useful in predicting the set of user characteristics that form the basis
for our ‘complex’ challenges. To identify this subset, we run LASSO regressions for each y
to induce variable selection, and include the selected variables {xk |βnaivek 6= 0}. For each of
these variables, we pair an additional behavior that measures a similar concept but which we
anticipate may be differently easy to manipulate (for example, if a na¨ıve regression selects
outgoing calls, we will also include the variable incoming calls).20 Note that by including only
a subset of variables, our procedure implicitly assumes that omitted variables are costless
to manipulate (and therefore should not be included in any decision rule); we will thus
underestimate the performance that could be attained with our method if costs were fully
estimated.21 In Section 5, we evaluate other potential methods to lower the expense of
20We determined “similar” behaviors as those that met at least one of the following conditions: (1)
correlated with the primary behavior with a coefficient of at least 0.75; (2) was a ‘close cousin’ of the primary
behavior, in that it was a different transformation of a similar underlying behavior (e.g., for ‘weekly number
of late-night calls’, ‘maximum number of late-night calls in a single day’ would be considered a close cousin);
(3) a cross validated LASSO regression that excluded the principal behavior from the feature set then newly
picked out this variable in its optimal set. From this list of similar behaviors, we picked alternates based on
our intuition of which behaviors would substitute the best, and which would be the easiest to explain in a
challenge.
21Note that this procedure will perform poorly if baseline predictiveness and manipulation cost are highly
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Table 3: Behavior Changes when Incentivized
BEHAVIOR OBSERVED
# Texts # Missed # Missed # People called # Calls w non-
sent calls calls (workday) contacts (weekend)
(outgoing) (incoming) (M-F, 9am-5pm)
change in actions per ¢ of incentive
BEHAVIOR INCENTIVIZED
# Texts sent 24.508 -0.052 -0.836 -0.305 -0.022
(0.0)*** (0.929) (0.337) (0.161) (0.953)
# Missed Outgoing Calls 4.16 0.709 0.825 0.128 -0.002
(0.058)* (0.079)* (0.167) (0.391) (0.995)
# Missed Incoming Calls -0.206 0.324 1.187 0.22 0.502
(0.942) (0.536) (0.126) (0.255) (0.126)
# People Called during Workday 2.307 0.156 0.68 0.497 0.108
(0.357) (0.734) (0.318) (0.003)*** (0.708)
# Calls w Non-Contacts on Weekend -2.022 -0.056 1.234 0.015 1.233
(0.481) (0.916) (0.113) (0.94) (0.0)***
Week and Individual Fixed Effects X X X X X
N (person-weeks) 7976 7976 7976 7976 7976
R2 0.705 0.637 0.552 0.604 0.491
Notes: P-values in parentheses. Bold indicates diagonal: effect on behavior j when behavior j is incentivized.
N represents person-weeks when no “incentive challenge” was assigned to the given participant. Individual
and weekly fixed effects included, excluding the first week and first individual hash. Each column represents
a separate regression, over the full set of covariates assigned; only the first five coefficients reported here. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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measuring manipulation costs.
Estimation
Finally, we use the data from all weeks of the experiment to jointly estimate types and
manipulation costs (using GMM with the moment conditions outlined in Section 3.1). We
allow manipulation cost to differ by behavior, by whether a person reports having high tech
skills, and by an unobserved random effect by person.22 Table 4 summarizes these estimated
costs. With our sample size, we find that off diagonal elements are noisily estimated, so we
penalize them to zero (λcostsoffdiagonal →∞); this results in a diagonal cost matrix C.
Several intuitive patterns can be discerned from the estimated manipulation costs in the
top panel of Table 4 (here we present only behaviors selected by models; see Supplemental
Appendix for all estimated costs). Outgoing communications are less costly to manipulate
than incoming communications. Text messages, which are relatively cheap to send, are more
manipulated than calls, which are relatively expensive. We also find that complex behaviors
(such as the standard deviation of talk time; estimated but not shown on this summary
diagram) are less manipulable than simpler behaviors (such as the average duration of talk
time).
Costs are also heterogeneous across people, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4.
On average it is 10%pt easier for individuals who report advanced or higher tech skills to
manipulate their mobile phone behaviors. Overall, including unobserved heterogeneity in
gaming ability, the 90th percentile finds it 2.5 times easier to game than the 10th percentile.
4.3 Results: Naive vs. Robust Decisions
The final and most important stage of the experiment compares decisions made by standard
machine learning algorithms to the decisions made by our new strategy-robust estimator that
accounts for the cost of manipulating behavior. The robust decision rules can be directly
estimated with Equation 1, which relies on the estimates of x and Ci that come from previous
stages of the experiment.
In this final stage, subjects receive complex challenges that reward them for their ultimate
negatively correlated: in that case we may omit a behavior k which is less predictive at baseline but is more
predictive in the counterfactual because it is difficult to manipulate.
22We have allowed for a single dimension of observed heterogeneity in costs z; with the rest absorbed into
unobserved heterogeneity V . Thus Spence signaling will only be captured in that dimension z. With a larger
sample one could estimate a more nuanced functional form for the observable portion, which would better
capture the correlations between gaming ability γi and bliss behavior xi.
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Table 4: Estimated Manipulation Costs
Heterogeneity by Behavior (C diagonal; subset of behaviors selected by models)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
text message you send
text you receive
text in the evening (6pm−10pm)
call you make
second of your shortest weekend call
person you text
call you receive
call with someone not in your contacts
maximum daily texts received
call you make that's missed
person who texts you
second of your average evening (6pm−10pm)
second of your average call duration
  0.03
  0.04
  0.06
  0.59
  0.64
  1.01
  1.33
  2.24
  2.30
  4.64
  6.01
 19.01
741.46
(    0.0000)
(    0.0000)
(    0.0000)
(    0.0001)
(    0.0001)
(    0.0002)
(    0.0006)
(    0.0007)
(    0.0016)
(    0.0428)
(    0.0074)
(    5.0605)
(16612.8388)
0.
00
01
0.
00
1
0.
01
0.
1
1 10 10
0
10
00
C: αjj (¢ action2)
Heterogeneity by Person (γi)
γi = e
−ωzi + vi
Low tech skills 1.00
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
de
ns
ity
High tech skills 1.10
In top panel: Red: used in a LASSO model; blue: used in SR model. Line segment represents standard
error. Parameters estimated using GMM. In cost matrix, off diagonal elements αjk; j6= k regularized to zero
(λcostsoffdiagonal → ∞), diagonal elements regularized with λcostsdiagonal = 1.0, set via cross validation. Standard
errors estimated from PD approximation of inverse Hessian. Shown here with vi winsorized at top and
bottom of range; in implementation, only bottom is winsorized, to maintain assumption of non-negative γi.
Only behaviors selected by models shown in Panel I; for all behaviors see Supplemental Appendix.
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classification, of the form ‘We’ll pay you M if you are classified as yˆ.’ We consider a focal
challenge of the form, ‘Earn up to 1000 Ksh. if the Sensing app guesses you are a high-income
earner.’ These challenges are designed to mimic real world applications of machine learning,
where depending on how they are classified, users may receive a loan (digital credit), grant
(targeted aid), or other benefits.
Estimating Decision Rules
In order to keep decision rules simple and interpretable for our participants, we consider
decision rules of up to three features. We regularize na¨ıve decision rules to three features,
selecting λdecision = max(λcv, λ3var), where λ3var is the smallest hyperparameter that results
in a 3 variable LASSO model. We use the same hyperparameter to penalize our strategy
robust decision rule, and allow it to select only among three variable models.23
Treatments
Participants are randomly assigned into different targets (yˆ), decision rules (standard: βLASSO,
or robust βstable), and whether the decision rule is kept opaque or revealed transparently to
the user. Under the opaque treatment, users are told only the outcome and the reward. Under
the transparent treatment, users see the coefficients of the decision rule, which reveals how
much they are rewarded for changing which behaviors. We included an interactive interface
that can be used to compute the payments that would result from different behavior (see
Figure 2c). Because the transparent treatment reveals information about potential decision
rules, after a person has seen a transparent challenge for yˆ, we do not assign them to an
opaque challenge for the same outcome.
Table 5 summarizes the effect of decision rule incentives on behavior. High income people
make more outgoing calls, and send fewer texts but receive more. If we pay people to ‘act like
a high-income earner,’ without revealing the decision rule, the response is noisy and often
in the wrong direction (participants place fewer calls and send more texts). Participants
who are transparently presented with the decision rule change their behavior, closer to the
direction incentivized by the algorithm, though the response is still noisy.
23For a given λdecision that selects three variables in a LASSO model, the strategy robust model will tend
to select more than three variables, because it induces some penalization on its own. Instead of restricting to
three variable models, one could alternately increase λdecision.
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Table 5: Agents Game Algorithms
# Calls # Texts # Texts # Calls w Non-Contacts Mean Call Duration
(outgoing) (outgoing) (incoming) (incoming + outgoing) (evening, seconds)
Weekly Challenge: Use your phone like a high-income earner!
Panel I: Incentives Generated by Algorithm (¢/action)
βLASSO 0.625 -0.395 0.065 0 0
Panel II: xit
Assigned to challenge, -6.5573 14.3701 12.0135 1.1672 -6.8104
algorithm opaque (9.949) (16.405) (20.583) (3.473) (7.002)
Assigned to challenge, 11.8231 -15.69 -11.907 0.6706 -4.5744
algorithm transparent (9.083) (14.976) (18.79) (3.17) (6.392)
N (Person-weeks) 1664 1664 1664 1664 1664
Notes: The first panel reports the decision rule associated with the challenge. The second reports the results
of a regression of behavior on challenge assignment. Regressions estimated based on dummy indicators
for complex challenge assignment for participants assigned “income” challenge, over person-weeks when
the income challenge was assigned or when no challenge was assigned (“control” weeks). Simple challenge
assignment person-weeks, used in estimating costs, are not included. Standard errors in parentheses.
Performance of decision rules
We compare performance of na¨ıve vs. robust decision rules in Table 6. The first two columns
(under ‘Income’) show results for the challenge that incentivized participants to use their
phones like a high-income earner; the last two columns show the performance averaged across
several different challenges. The decision rules and associated manipulation costs are shown
in the top panel (“Decision Rule”); the relative performance of the different estimators is
shown below (under “Prediction Error”). We note several results.
First, in the top panel, we observe important differences in the decision rules estimated
by βLASSO vs. βact. LASSO places weight on the behaviors that were most correlated at
baseline: outgoing calls, outgoing texts, and incoming texts. However, the estimated costs
of manipulating some of these behavior – and in particular the costs of manipulating text
messaging behavior – are low, and therefore likely to be manipulated when incentivized.
Thus, our strategy robust decision rule both selects less manipulable behaviors (evening texts
rather than incoming texts), and shrinks manipulable behaviors (especially outgoing texts).
We evaluate prediction error using root mean squared error (RMSE), in units of dollars,
in the middle panel. The magnitude of error is similar to the average payout, around $3 for a
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Table 6: Strategy Robust vs. Standard Decision Rules
Income Costs All Outcomes (Pooled)
Income, Intelligence, Activity PCA
Decision Rule βLASSO βstable αjj
¢/action ¢/action2
# Calls (outgoing) 0.625 0.542 0.591 . .
# Texts (outgoing) -0.395 -0.107 0.035 . .
# Texts (incoming) 0.065 0 0.038 . .
# Texts (6pm-10pm) 0 -0.121 0.058 . .
Prediction Error RMSE ($) RMSE ($)
Baseline Data: Control 3.55 3.55 3.70 3.75
Baseline Data: Predicted Transparent 4.66 3.83 4.34 3.85
Implemented: Opaque 3.24 3.23 4.00 3.80
Implemented: Transparent 3.87 3.66 4.93 4.31
Predicted Cost of Transparency ≤0.28 ≤0.15
Equilibrium Cost of Transparency ≤0.41 ≤0.31
Average Payout ($) 3.30 3.24 3.23 2.98
N (Control Person-Weeks) 3781 3781 3781 3781
N (Treatment Person-Weeks, Opaque) 85 85 230 230
N (Treatment Person-Weeks, Trans.) 91 74 252 216
Notes: The first panel reports the decision rule associated with the challenge, and the costs associated with
these behaviors. The second reports the performance of the different models over the groups they were
assigned to; on the left, the naive LASSO regression, and on the right, this paper’s strategy-robust (SR)
model. Performance figures estimated using a regression of model indicators on week-model RMSE, weighted
by number of person-weeks. ‘Transparent Predicted’ RMSE denotes the RMSE that our theoretical model
expected, given costs of manipulation and behavioral incentives. ‘Predicted Cost of Transparency’ denotes
the difference between predicted transparent RMSE under the SR model and baseline RMSE under the naive
LASSO. ‘Equilibrium Cost of Transparency’ denotes the difference between implemented transparent SR
model RMSE and opaque naive model RMSE. Pooled performance is estimated using this same regression
approach, after combining all model-weeks over the three outcomes investigated: a PCA of phone activity,
intelligence, and monthly income. Full regression results and standard errors reported in appendix.
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week. The first row shows prediction error in the baseline data: LASSO performs slightly
better than our strategy robust estimator when no manipulation is expected. But when
people manipulate their behavior, our method is expected to perform better, as shown in the
second row.
When actually implemented, our method performs better when the decision rule is
transparent (average error $3.66 instead of $3.87 for income; or $4.31 vs. $4.93 for all
outcomes pooled). When the decision rule is opaque, we find that our method performs
comparably to or slightly better than LASSO, possibly due to increased shrinkage ($3.23 vs.
$3.24 for income; $3.80 vs. $4.00 for all outcomes pooled). Table A3 reports results for all
outcomes.
Even if a policymaker intended to keep the decision rule opaque, using our robust method
can reduce systematic risk in the chance that agents discover the decision rule. In practical
implementations, policymakers could adaptively tweak the level of robustness to match the
level of manipulation. An ad hoc approach could select a convex combination of the naive
and robust models; a more nuanced approach could model consumers’ uncertainty about the
model.
Cost of transparency
Our framework provides a way to bound a key cost of imposing algorithmic transparency
(Akyol et al., 2016). Many tech firms argue that imposing transparency would reduce the
quality of machine decisions, because rules may perform better if they can rely on opacity
to prevent manipulation. Our method allows us to bound this performance cost. We can
compare the performance arising from the optimal opaque rule (under the assumption that
opacity will prevent it from being manipulated) to the optimal equilibrium transparent
rule (factoring in equilibrium manipulation). Because the opaque rule also faces the threat
of manipulation, this difference is the upper bound of the performance cost of imposing
transparency, arising from increased manipulation.
The most straightforward way to measure this cost of transparency would require disclosing
the decision rule to a subset of users, and assessing any drop in performance after a process
of equilibration. But for the most consequential decisions, once the decision rule is revealed
to some, it can leak out to the entire market. Such disclosure irreversibly tips the market to
transparency, and thus is a nonstarter for policy discussions.
Crucially, under the assumptions of our model, this quantity can be estimated without
revealing the decision rule: it only requires the estimation of types and costs (the first part
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of our experiment).24 Our method makes it possible for regulators or firms to assess the cost
that transparency would impose—prior to making their model transparent. Our model based
estimates suggest that transparency introduces a performance cost of ≤ $0.28 (8% of baseline
error) for our income targeting rule, or ≤ $0.15 (4%) for all outcomes pooled together. These
numbers are shown in the final rows of the middle panel of Table 6.
When we actually implement transparency in our experiment, we find that the performance
cost is similar to these model based estimates: ≤ $0.41 (13%) for income, or ≤ $0.31 (8%)
for all outcomes pooled together. (To mitigate the problem of leakage, we only assess opaque
performance prior to each individual observing a transparent challenge for that outcome.
Because our decision rules were not going to be used later in production, we were unconcerned
about them leaking out after the experiment.)
5 Extensions
5.1 Alternate methods to estimate manipulation costs
Our method requires estimating C and γi, which are new objects. The experimental approach
we use is likely not feasible in many settings. We offer suggestions on alternative approaches
to measure these costs.
Expert elicitations. We evaluate how well experts can predict the costs of manipulating
different behaviors, using a method similar to DellaVigna and Pope (2016). We sent a survey
to 177 experts with different backgrounds (PhDs from different fields, research assistants,
Busara staff who had not worked on the experiment, and Mechanical Turk workers in the
US) to predict how Kenyans would manipulate different phone behaviors when incentivized.
Results are shown in Figure 3. In panel A, we compare the predicted change in behavior
from a given incentive to the actual experimental estimate (∆jj := xj(βj)− x¯j). In Panel B,
we compare the implied structural cost estimates (for predicted costs αˆjj =
γ¯·βj
∆jj
); although
experts predict that costs are too low, the correlation is 0.75. This suggests that it may be
possible to use expert elicitations to estimate manipulation costs.
Partially estimated. The costs of behavior k may be related to that of behavior k′. Because
of this, we may be able to predict unknown cost αkj based on correlations between types x
and known costs, for some prediction function: αˆkj = f(C, x).
24Our method of estimating costs does requires revealing the existence of features to users, but does not
require specifying whether those features are included in the model, or with what weights (one could estimate
costs for a large set of features, hiding the features critical to the model).
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Figure 3: Expert Elicited Manipulation Cost Estimates
(a) Reduced Form Shift in Behavior (b) Structural Cost Estimates
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5.2 Nonlinear decision rules
To sharpen intuition, this paper focuses on linear decision rules. While many modern
machine learned decision rules are nonlinear, agents’ beliefs about those rules may be well
approximated by linear functions. In such a context, our derivations could be viewed as
linear approximations to both these beliefs, and the actual functions. Additionally, it may be
that some benefits of extreme nonlinearities that can surface in modern machine learning
are lessened when manipulation is taken into account: contract theory suggests that linear
decision rules are more robust (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Carroll, 2015).25
Our approach could also be extended to work in nonlinear settings. In nonlinear environ-
ments there may also be multiple equilibria. In such a setting, if iterative learning converges,
it may converge to a local optimum, whereas an approach like ours could be used to select a
global equilibrium.26
6 Conclusion
This paper considers the possibility that the implementation of machine decisions changes
the world they describe. We focus on the case where individuals manipulate their behavior in
order to game decision rules. Our chief contribution is to derive decision rules that anticipate
this manipulation, by embedding a behavioral model of how individuals will respond. This
25With the exception that linear models can be subject to the influence of outliers; one may thus want to
tamp down inputs as they approach the boundaries of the distribution of training data.
26Thanks to Glen Weyl for this point.
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structural approach makes it possible to decompose decision rules into constituent components,
and to gather data on how those components can be manipulated. From these components,
our structural model allows us to understand how any proposed decision rule of a given
form would be manipulated. This allows us to compute decision rules that are optimal in
equilibrium.
We demonstrate our method in a field experiment in Kenya, by deploying a tailor-made
smartphone app that mimics the ‘digital credit’ loan products that are now commonplace
in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that even some of the world’s poorest users of technology
– who are relatively recent adopters of smartphones and to whom whom the concept of an
‘algorithm’ is quite foreign (Musya and Kamau, 2018) – are savvy enough to change their
behavior to game machine decisions. In this setting, we show that our strategy robust
estimator outperforms standard estimators on average by 13% when individuals are given
information about the scoring rule. This framework also allows us to quantify the “cost of
transparency”, i.e., the loss in predictive performance associated with moving from “security
through obscurity” (with a naive decision rule) to a regime of full algorithmic transparency
(with our strategy-robust rule). We estimate this loss to be roughly 8% in equilibrium –
substantially less than the 23% loss associated with making the naive rule transparent.
Our discussion focuses on the simple case of linear models with a small number of
predictor variables, where subjects have either no information or full transparency of the
scoring rule. We envision useful extensions to more complex models and more nuanced
beliefs. More generally, our approach of embedding a model of behavior within a machine
learning estimator may be relevant to a wide range of contexts where machine learning
systems face a changing human environment. In this sense, it offers a machine learning
interpretation of Lucas (1976), where algorithmic decisions change the context of the systems
they model. For example, financial forecasts may affect the underlying financial processes
they attempt to describe, personalized news recommendations may change the information
seeking behaviors of consumers, and predictions about the intensity of a disease may affect
individuals’ protective behaviors and thus its realized intensity.
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Appendices
A1 Experimental Design
A1.1 Pre Analysis Plan
This study was pre-registered with the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0004649) prior to
the experiment (September 3, 2019).27
Our implementation deviated in several respects from the pre analysis plan: at the start
of phase 2 the cloud server account ran out of storage space, and the Busara center was hit
by a power outage due to construction on a nearby road. These two events disrupted servers
for several hours during the upload window, and caused some participants’ phones to become
overloaded with records. It took several weeks to recover the affected participants. Because
of the disruption, we extended phase 2 and delayed the expert cost surveys.
A1.2 Attrition Management
Attrition in the context of this study had two dimensions: first, there were participants who
do not regularly upload data through their app, and second, there were participants who did
not participate in the assigned weekly challenges. (As some participants may have uploaded
data sparsely throughout the week, only those who uploaded within the 21-hour window at
the end of the challenge-week [between 1pm Tuesday and 10am Wednesday] were counted as
having fully uploaded all of their weekly data.)
In order to minimize both such types of attrition, participants were sent regular reminders
via text to encourage engagement. Every participant in the study was sent a text every
Tuesday at 1pm to remind them to upload their data through the Smart Sensing app.
Additionally, on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, participants who still had not uploaded
data or activated their challenge respectively were contacted by phone and surveyed by the
Busara team. Specifically, the protocol was as follows:
27Prior to the collection of the main outcomes in phase 2, we amended the registration, adding one sentence
that specifies that the focal performance measure will be mean squared error (which corresponds with the
objective minimized by the method; January 15, 2020). We later noticed that the registration still contained
text in another section that appeared to specify that the focal measures would be R2 or AUC; prior to the
completion of phase 2 and prior to analysis of the main outcomes, we amended the registration to delete that
sentence (February 4, 2020).
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• On Wednesday, participants who had not uploaded any data during the five day period
ending on Wednesday at 12pm were contacted and surveyed, as were those who uploaded
some data in this period but not during the ‘end-of-week upload window’ (between
6pm Tuesday and 10am Wednesday)
• On Thursday, participants whose phones showed that they did not receive a challenge
by Thursday 12pm were contacted and surveyed, as were participants whose phones
show that they did receive a challenge but who had not opted in to accept the challenge.
• On Friday, participants whose phones showed that they still had not received and
opted-in to a challenge were contacted and surveyed, as were participants whose phones
showed that they did receive a challenge but who had not opted in to accept the
challenge.
For all of the above categories, any participant who did not answer a call on the first attempt
would be re-contacted once more by the surveyor after the rest of the calls were complete.
Finally, to mitigate the effects of attrition during the analysis stage, any participant-weeks
wherein the participant did not opt in and/or did not upload during the end-of-week upload
window were dropped from the sample prior to all analysis. During baseline weeks, a single
passive challenge was assigned to all participants, offering a flat bonus to upload data within
the upload window; in this way, we ensured that our analysis control groups would also be
restricted to those who opt in to this passive challenge, and were thus a valid comparison
group to the restricted panel during the challenge weeks.
A1.3 Communicating Decision Rules
In focus groups we found that individuals had difficulty understanding decimals or complicated
mathematical operations (e.g., standard deviation). We stuck to simple behaviors and
formatted decision rules as follows, to make it easier for participants to understand how their
marginal behavior affects their payment:
• Each coefficient is rounded to the nearest integer. If the nearest integer is zero, the
denominator was inflated by factors of 10 until it became nonzero. (If the unit was
seconds or minutes, the denominator was instead inflated by factors of 60.)
• The order of indicators was randomized between three orderings (ABC, CAB, BCA for
indicators A, B, and C).
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• The constant term was reported last, unless the first coefficient was negative, in which
case the constant was reported first.
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A2 Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Comparative Statics
Note: The first behavior is more predictive in the baseline behavior (b1 > b2), but is
easily manipulable (α11  α22). Below panels show weights on coefficients as
manipulation costs are scaled for:
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As x2 becomes cheaper to manipulate (α22
decreases), βstable places less weight on it, and
adjusts the weight placed on x1.
If manipulating one variable makes it easier to
manipulate the other (α12 sufficiently negative),
βstable reduces weight on both.
xi
iid∼ N (0, 1), b = [1.4, 1], C = 1γγi
[
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]
, 1γi
iid∼ Uniform [0, 10], i iid∼ N (0, 0.25).
Squared error measured on an out of sample draw from the same population, incentivized to that
decision rule.
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Figure A3
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Each row and column represent a feature of behavior. Features are clustered into similar groups. The diagonal
indicates that the correlation of a feature with itself is +1.
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A3 Appendix Tables
Table A1: Manipulation Can Harm Prediction (Monte Carlo): “Industry Approach”
Decision Rule Performance (squared loss)
β0 β1 β2 β3 No manip. Manipulation
Panel A: Data generating process
bDGP 0.200 3.000 0.100 0.100 0.267 3745.046
Panel B: Standard Approaches
βOLS 0.205 3.042 0.061 0.116 0.266 3961.225
‘Industry’ Approach (estimated with just data from that period)
βOLS(1) after βOLS -0.798 0.061 2.090 -1.675 3.275 625.762
βOLS(2) after βOLS 0.172 3.111 -0.040 0.215 0.270 4332.208
βOLS(3) after βOLS -0.755 0.120 2.077 -1.671 3.071 619.059
...
βOLS(1000) after βOLS -0.393 3.741 -1.341 1.566 1.375 11611.884
βOLS(1001) after βOLS -0.404 0.704 1.861 -1.526 1.674 565.383
Notes: Monte Carlo simulation results. Panel A shows the coefficients that relate the outcome (y) to
behaviors (x) under the data generating process (DGP). Panel B shows coefficients from OLS, under
behavior without manipulation: xi(0), or with manipulation: xi(β). Parameters:
C =

1.0 0.1 0.2
0.1 2.0 0.8
0.2 0.8 4.0
 , x iid∼ N
0,

1 1 0.1
1 2 1
0.1 1 1

 , γi =
{
1 xi1 ≤ 0.2
10 xi1 > 0.2
, ei
iid∼ N(0, 0.25)
46
Table A2: Manipulation Can Improve Prediction (Monte Carlo)
Decision Rule Performance (squared loss)
β0 β1 β2 No manipulation Manipulation
Panel A: Data generating process
bDGP 1.00 0.10 0.01 8.749 8.748
Panel B: Standard Approach
βOLS 1.014 -0.003 0.130 8.724 8.720
Panel C: Strategy Robust Method
βstable 1.014 -0.022 0.156 8.725 8.719
Notes: Monte Carlo simulation results. Panel A shows the coefficients that relate the
outcome (y) to behaviors (x) under the data generating process (DGP). Panel B shows
estimated coefficients from OLS; Panel C shows coefficients estimated with the strategy
robust method. Performance is assessed on the same sample of individuals, under behavior
without manipulation: xi(0), or with: xi(β). Parameters:
C =
 2 0.5
0.5 1
 , xi iid∼ N
0,
 2 0.5
0.5 1
, γi = 0.1ui − 
3
i +B
ui ∼ N(0, 1)
B set so min γi = 0.1
, i
iid∼ N(0, 9)
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